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Abstract 
 
 
This paper analyses cross-border contagion in a sample of European banks from January 1994 
to January 2003. We use a multinomial logit model to estimate the number of banks in a given 
country that experience a large shock on the same day (“coexceedances”) as a function of 
variables measuring common shocks and coexceedances in other countries. Large shocks are 
measured by the bottom 95th percentile of the distribution of the first difference in the daily 
distance to default of the bank. We find evidence in favour of significant cross-border 
contagion. We also find some evidence that since the introduction of the euro cross-border 
contagion may have increased. The results seem to be very robust to changes in the 
specification. 
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 1.  Introduction 
Contagion is widely perceived to be an important element of banking crises and 
systemic risk. Very prominently, for example, the private sector rescue operation of 
LTCM in 1998, co-ordinated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was justified 
by the risk of contagion. Similarly, contagion transmitted through the interbank market 
played a major role in the failure of a number of Japanese Securities houses in the early 
1990s (Padoa-Schioppa, 2003). The aim of this paper is to estimate the extent of cross-
border contagion among the banking sectors of the largest EU countries. It is intended 
to contribute to a better understanding of the degree to which European banking systems 
have become interconnected and how banking problems could spread across borders.  
When we use the term “contagion”, we mean the transmission of a shock 
affecting one bank or possibly a group of banks and how this shock is transmitted to 
other banks or banking sectors. Defined in this way, contagion is a subset of the broader 
concept of a systemic crisis, which may be the result of contagion or of a common 
shock affecting all banks simultaneously. In this paper, we use the distance to default 
(e.g. KMV, 2002), a market based indicator of the soundness of the bank. 
 The distance 
to default is defined as the difference between the current market value of assets of a 
firm and its estimated default point, divided by the volatility of assets
1. In order to 
investigate contagion among banking systems we focus on the behaviour of the tail of 
the distribution of the change in the distance to default
2. For each country we construct 
an indicator variable named “coexceedances” by counting the number of banks that 
experience a large shock in the distance to default on a given day. Large shocks are 
measured by large negative (in the bottom 95
th percentile of the distribution) percentage 
changes in the daily distance to default of the bank. We then estimate the probability of 
several bank simultaneously experiencing a large shock in country j as a function of 
systemic risk emanating from domestic and international risk factors and from 
coexceedances in the other large EU countries. Econometrically, our approach builds on 
a recent papers by Bae et al. (2003) which uses a similar methodology to study 
contagion among stock market returns in emerging economies. 
                                                      
1   We give a detailed description of the distance to default in the next section. 
2   Our choice of focusing on the tails of the distribution has already been adopted in the literature. Gropp and 
Moerman (2004) use the co-incidence of extreme shocks in banks’ distance to default to examine contagion. 
They employ Monte Carlo simulations to show that standard distributional assumptions (multivariate Normal, 
Student t) cannot replicate the patterns of observed in tails of the data. This implies that not only the distribution 
of distances to default of individual banks exhibit fat tails, but also that the correlation among banks’ distances to 
default is substantially higher for larger shocks. Bae et al. (2003) do the same for emerging market stock returns 
and conclude, as Gropp and Moerman (2004) that it may be justified to examine the tails of the distribution of 
returns (in our case of the distance to default) only.   2
For our sample of (predominately) large banks
3 for January 1994 to January 
2003 that are stock market listed, we find evidence of significant cross border 
contagion. We also find some evidence that cross-border contagion increased in 
importance after the introduction of the euro. We subject the results to a battery of 
robustness checks and find them to be quite robust to changes in specification, method 
of estimation, selection of banks and other considerations. 
The theoretical banking literature has focussed on contagion among banks via 
the interbank market. Allen and Gale (2000) show that, in a Diamond/Dybvig (1983) 
liquidity framework an “incomplete” market structure, with only unilateral exposure 
chains across banks, is the most vulnerable to contagion. In contrast, a “complete” 
structure, with banks transacting with all other banks, contains less risk of contagion.
4 A 
“tiered structure” of a “money centre” bank (or banks), where all banks have relations 
with the centre bank, but not with each other, is also susceptible to contagion (Freixas, 
Parigi and Rochet, 2000). In both papers, contagion arises from unforeseen liquidity 
shocks, i.e. banks withdrawing interbank deposits at other banks. Alternatively, 
contagion conceivably could arise from credit risk in the interbank market, namely 
deposits at other banks not being repaid.
5  
There may be contagion even in the absence of explicit financial links between 
banks. In the presence of asymmetric information difficulties in one bank may be 
perceived as a signal of possible difficulties in others, especially if one thinks that 
banks’ assets may be opaque and balance sheet data and other publicly available 
information may be uninformative (Morgan, 2002).
6 In Freixas, Parigi and Rochet 
(2000) if a liquidity shock hits one bank, depositors may run on other banks as well, 
even if they are perfectly solvent, if they fear that there may be insufficient liquid assets 
in the banking system. Recently, Cifuentes et al. (2004) have proposed that there may 
be contagion through fire sales of illiquid assets. If banks use fair value accounting to 
value at least some of their illiquid assets at imputed market prices and the demand for 
illiquid assets is less than perfectly elastic, sales by distressed institutions depress the 
market prices of such assets. Prices fall, inducing a further round of sales and so forth. 
                                                      
3   We use the largest stock listed banks in Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
4   The intuition is that in the case of an “incomplete” market (or "tiered structure"), the effects of a shock hitting one 
bank are concentrated, while in the case of a “complete” market the shock is distributed among a large number of 
banks and, thus, it can be more easily absorbed. 
5   Iyer and Peydro-Alcalde (2005a) model the mechanism of contagion through the money market and show how 
the reactions of banks initially unaffected by the shock can result in an endogenous reduction in liquidity, which 
in turn results in further stress on the banking system. 
6   For recent evidence to the contrary see Flannery et al. (2004).   3
In their model, relatively small shocks can result in contagious failures in the banking 
system.
7  
There is a vast previous empirical literature on within-country contagion. First, 
evidence of contagion has been estimated using autocorrelation and survival time tests 
using historical data on bank failures. A number of papers have tested for 
autocorrelation in bank failures, controlling for macroeconomic conditions, generally in 
historical samples during which bank failures were common occurrences in the US.
8 
Most of these studies find some evidence of contagion, i.e. bank failures tend to be 
autocorrelated controlling for macro variables. Similarly, using survival time tests, 
Calomiris and Mason (2000) find that bank-level, regional and national fundamentals 
can explain a large portion of the probability of survival of banks during the Great 
Depression. They also find some evidence of contagion, which, however, is limited to 
specific regions of the US. Inherently, both approaches are limited to times of sweeping 
bank failures.  
In this paper, we examine the spill over effects during calm times using a stock 
market-based default risk indicator (distance to default). In this way, we hope to 
uncover information that may still be indicative of the links during times of actual crisis. 
In this sense, studies examining the reaction of stock prices to news and studies using 
actual interbank data and simulating the failure of one or more banks are more closely 
related to our work. The literature examining the reaction of stock prices to news 
suggests that stock price reactions vary proportionally to the degree of the news’ extent 
of affecting the bank and banks’ share prices react to problems of other banks. 
However, the findings could also be consistent with no contagion, as the results may be 
driven by common shocks, rather than contagion.
9  
A large number of papers for different countries have used actual or estimated 
interbank links to simulate contagion. Generally, the evidence of contagion resulting in 
significant bank failures is mixed. While Furfine (2003) for the US and Sheldon and 
Maurer (1998) for Switzerland find relatively benign effects, Upper and Worms (2003) 
estimate a matrix of interbank loans for German banks and find some stronger evidence 
of contagion risk. Degryse and Nguyen (2004) for Belgium find that the patterns of 
linkages changed from a structure with complete links among banks to one in which 
                                                      
7   Other channels of contagion could be the payment system, where difficulties in one bank may lead to credit 
losses to other banks (in netting systems) or gridlock in the entire system or ownership links among banks. 
8   Grossman (1993) looks at U.S. data for 1875-1914, Hasan and Dwyer (1994) consider the U.S. free banking era 
(1837-1863), and Schoenmaker (1996) the years 1880-1936, again in the U.S. 
9   For a survey see De Bandt and Hartmann (2001).   4
there  are  multiple  money  centre  banks. Overall, the change in structure suggests a 
decrease in the risk of contagion. While Degryse and Nguyen discuss the possibility of 
cross-border contagion, generally the simulations studies concentrate on contagion risk 
within one country, rather than across countries.  
Most closely related to the approach in this paper and the only other paper we 
are aware of that examines cross-border contagion among banking systems, Hartmann 
et al. (2004b) use multivariate extreme value theory to estimate contagion in Europe and 
the US. They find that contagion may have increased from the mid-1990s onwards both 
in Europe and the US. Overall, however, the level of contagion risk in the US remains 
higher than in the EU. Iyer and Peydro-Alcalde (2005b) estimate in a unique dataset for 
India the effect of the failure of one large regional bank (due to fraud). They find that 
banks’ exposures with the failed bank in the interbank market as an important 
determinant of depositor withdrawals of the banks. The evidence is strongly supportive 
of contagion in interbank markets. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next Section, we describe the 
data used in the paper and give some descriptive statistics. Section III explains our 
primary econometric approach, the multinomial logit model. Section IV presents our 
econometric results. Section V discusses a few issues related to the robustness of our 
findings. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Sample, definition of variables and descriptive statistics  
In our sample selection, we started with all banks in France, Germany, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom that are listed at a stock exchange and 
whose stock price and total debt are available from Datastream during January 1994 to 
January 2003 (50 banks). We limited ourselves to these countries, as almost all largest 
internationally active European banks are headquartered in these countries (see Table 
1). We deleted all banks that had trading volume below one thousand stocks in more 
than 30% of all trading days and banks which had less than 100 weeks of stock data 
available (7 banks). We deleted three additional banks where we had serious concerns 
about data quality.
10 For those banks where the distant to default was not available for 
the entire period under review (5 banks), we imputed a total of 342 missing values using 
linear interpolation and random numbers (for details see the notes to table 2). In this 
                                                      
10 The banks showed zero equity returns on a high number of trading days, resulting in extremely volatile distances to 
default.    5
way, we ensure that the “coexceedances” (see below) for each country are built using 
the same banks during the entire period under analysis. This yields a complete data set 
for 40 banks. For each bank the sample contains 2263 daily observations, i.e. a total of 
94,520 observations. 
The banks in the sample are generally quite large relative to the population of 
banks in the EU (Table 1). On average, their total assets amount to EUR 178 billion 
(median: EUR 132 billion). The relatively large average size is an outcome of the 
requirement that the bank be traded at a stock exchange. Nevertheless, the size variation 
is considerable within the sample. For example, the largest bank, Deutsche Bank, is 
more than 300 times the size of the smallest. The degree of coverage in each country 
depends on the number of banks traded at a stock exchange and the structure of the 
banking system, but despite the relatively low number of banks the coverage is quite 
high. The fraction of the total assets of commercial banks covered in our data varies 
from 36% for France to 68% for Spain.
11 
The distance to default (KMV, 2002), is defined as the difference between the 
current market value of assets of a firm and its estimated default point, divided by the 
volatility of assets. In order to compute the distance to default some assumptions must 
be made. Intuitively, the value of equity of a company can be seen as a call option, since 
at the time of the repayment of the debt the value of equity is the maximum between 
zero and the difference between total assets and total debt. Equity is therefore modelled 
as a call option on the assets of the company. The level and the volatility of assets are 
calculated with the Black and Scholes model using the observed market value and 
volatility of equity and the balance sheet data on debt. A detailed description of the 
method used to compute the distance to default is in Appendix 1. The distance to default 
increases either when the values of assets increases or/and when volatility of assets goes 
down. An increase in the distance to default means that the firm is moving away from 
the default point and that the bankruptcy event becomes less likely. Being a market 
based measure of distress, the distance to default has the advantage that it contains 
expectations of market participants and therefore it is forward looking. Gropp et al. 
(2004, 2006) argue that, specifically with respect to banks, the distance to default may 
be a particularly suitable and all-encompassing measure of default risk. In particular, its 
ability to measure default risk correctly is not affected by the potential incentives of the 
stock holders to prefer increased risk taking (unlike e.g. in the case of unadjusted equity 
returns) or by the presence of explicit or implicit safety nets (unlike e.g. subordinated 
                                                      
11 The total assets of commercial banks in a country were taken from the OECD’s Bank Profitability data.   6
debt spreads). Further, it combines  information about stock returns with 
leverage and volatility information, thus encompassing the most important determinants 
of default risk (unlike e.g. unadjusted stock returns). 
In order to obtain our dependent variable, we calculated the daily distance to 
default for each bank in the sample and for each time period, t,. We then defined large 
shocks as the negative 95
th percentile of the common distribution of the percentage 
change in distance to default ( | | / it it dd dd Δ ) across all banks.
12 Choosing the bottom 95
th 
percentile was a compromise between the need for “large” shocks in the spirit of 
extreme value theory (Straetmans, 2000) and maintaining adequate sample size for the 
estimation. Finally, we counted the number of banks in a given country that were 
simultaneously in the tail, which we, following Bae et al. (2003), labelled the 
coexceedances of banks in a given country. 
In order to control for common shocks we rely on the existing literature on financial 
crises and contagion (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002, and Rigobon, 2003). Our model is 
basically a factor model in which the occurrence of coexceedances is a function of some 
domestic and international common factors and coexceedances in other countries. In our 
model, coexceedances in other countries are the source of potential contagion. We use 
four variables to control for common shocks. The main selection criterion was that the 
variables can be measured at a daily frequency. This is essential, as we want to model 
daily innovations in the distance to default.
13  
The first common factor, which we label “systemic risk”, is an indicator 
measuring the number of stock markets that are experiencing a large shock at time t. We 
construct this variable as follows: Emulating our approach to modelling large shocks in 
banks, we use indicator variables that we set equal to one if a stock market of a given 
country experienced a shock large enough to be in the bottom 95
th percentile of the 
distribution of daily returns. Equivalently, we calculate indicator variables for the Euro 
Area stock market index, the US and Emerging market stock indices. We use total 
market indices as provided by Datastream; except for emerging markets the MSCI 
Emerging Market Index is used. “Systemic risk” is then the sum of indicator variables 
measuring whether or not the domestic stock market, the US stock market, the European 
                                                      
12 This definition relies on the assumption that the stochastic process governing the distance to default at different 
banks is the same. This assumption turns out to be reasonable, however, as redoing the analyisis reported below 
with bank-specific tail occurrences yields quantitatively very similar results. 
13 As a consequence, many other variables available at lower frequency that might have explanatory power as 
common shocks do not enter into the model directly. We don’t think this is a problem. Since financial variables 
incorporate news and expectations regarding several factors affecting the business scenario, we believe that any 
relevant information we might want to include regarding economic growth, monetary policy or other shocks, is 
discounted in financial prices.    7
stock market and the index of emerging market stock markets are in the tail on a 
given day. Hence, it ranges from 0 to 4.
14 This variables measures something that we 
would label a “global shock”, i.e. if many markets experience large shocks 
simultaneously. This distinguishes it from a domestic shock, which we measure using 
the domestic conditional stock market volatility (see below). “Systemic risk” should be 
positively related to the number of coexceedances. 
The second factor (“yield curve”) is the daily change in absolute value of the 
slope of the yield curve. The slope is defined as the difference between the yield of the 
10 year government bond and the yield of the 1 year note in a given country.
15 This 
variable is a commonly used measure of expectations on economic growth and 
monetary policy. One view of banks suggests that they transform short-term liabilities 
(deposits) into long term assets (loans). A flattening of the yield curve results in an 
increase of the interest rate banks have to pay on their short term liabilities without a 
corresponding increase in the rates they can charge on their loans. We would, thus, 
expect this variable to be positively related to the number of coexceedances. 
The third factor (“volatility own”) is the daily change in the volatility of the 
domestic stock market. Bae et al. (2003) found this variable to be particularly important 
when explaining emerging market coexceedances and we follow their approach here. 
Stock market volatility has been estimated using a GARCH(1,1) model of the form 
(1) 
2
1 , 2
2
1 , 1
2
− − + + = t c t c tc σ β ε β α σ  
using maximum likelihood, where 
2
tc σ  represents the conditional variance of the stock 
market index in country c in period t and ε  represents the error term. The estimated 
parameters are reported in Appendix 2. We obtain, depending on the country, values of 
between 0.06 and 0.11 for β1 and between 0.89 and 0.93 for β2. While we are interested 
in contagion among European banks, it is possible that there are volatility spill-overs 
from other parts of the world as well. To control for these, we also control for the stock 
market volatility from the US in the regressions, estimated also with a GARCH (1,1) 
(“volatility US”).
 16 As US markets open later than European markets, we used data 
from the previous day to estimate US volatility. Further, we include one lag of the 
domestic coexceedances, as we suspect that first-differencing and using only the large 
                                                      
14 We also experimented with including the indicator variables for each market separately. However, their correlation 
is generally above 0.5 within the EU and around 0.2  and 0.3 with the US and emerging markets, respectively. 
15 If the yield of the 1 year treasury note was not available, we used the interbank rate for the same maturity. The 
source of the data are Datastream and the BIS.  
16 “Volatility own” and “volatility US” were rescaled by multiplying the estimated values by 1000.   8
negative tail events of the distance to  default may not have removed all 
autocorrelation in the dependent variable.  
Table 2 shows that the banks in the sample on average are just above four 
standard deviations away from the default point (mean distance to default of 4.13). 
However, this hides substantial variation in the health of banks. Only one bank shows 
distances to default below one. At the other end of the spectrum, there were a number of 
banks with a maximal distance to default of above 10. As expected, the mean of the first 
difference in the distance to default is approximately zero, the largest negative change is 
77%, which can truly be considered a sizeable daily shock. The negative 95
th percentile 
is at about -1%.  
Tables 3 and 4 present some additional descriptive statistics on the variable of 
interest, the number of banks simultaneously in the tail on a given day, i.e. the number 
of coexceedances. The number of banks per country differs somewhat: In Italy there are 
12 banks in the sample, while in France and the Netherlands there are only three. The 
UK, Spain and Germany are also well represented with 8, 7 and 7 banks, respectively. 
Table 3 also shows that there is at least one day on which all, or almost all banks, 
experienced a large adverse shock simultaneously. This is explored in more detail in 
Table 4.  
As we will estimate a multinomial logit model, which implies that we will estimate one 
coefficient per outcome, we follow Bae et al. (2003) and limit the number of outcomes 
to 0,1,2, and 3 or more coexceedances, except for France and The Netherlands where 
we limit the number of outcomes to 2 or more. Table 4 shows, for example, that in 
Spain, there were 50 days with three or more coexceedances, in the United Kingdom 
there were 88 such days and in Italy 125 such days, while in The Netherlands and 
France there were 78 and 75 days with 2 or more coexceedances, respectively. The 
number of coexceedances is a function of the number of banks included in the sample 
and does not necessarily reflect the strength or weakness of the banking sector per se. 
Still, comparing countries with an equal number of banks in the sample suggests that 
Spanish banks tend to experience fewer shocks compared to German banks and that 
Dutch banks tend to be about equally frequently subject to large shocks compared to 
French banks. Of the total of 40 banks in the sample, a maximum of 20 are 
simultaneously in the tail (on October 2, 1998) and there are 14 days with more than 15 
coexceedances (not reported in Tables). 
   9
3.  Econometric model  
We study whether contagion is one factor associated with negative large movements in 
banks’ default risk. These events can be identified from the negative tail of the 
distribution of the innovations in our preferred market-based indicator of default risk, 
the distance to default.  
Our dependent variable is the number of coexceedances of banks on a given day, 
which is a count variable. There are many methods to estimate a model with count data 
as the dependent variable, including tobit models, Poisson models, negative binomial 
models, multinomial and ordered logit models. A tobit model is clearly inappropriate as 
it relies on the assumption that the dependent variable is truncated normal, an 
assumption, which Gropp and Moerman (2004) also show to be rejected in the data used 
in this paper. Poisson models rely on the assumption of equality between mean and 
variance of the dependent variable, an assumption, also rejected in our sample. The 
negative binomial model is essentially a generalised Poisson model, which avoids this 
restrictive assumption of mean/variance equality. Nevertheless, it still makes the 
restrictive assumption that the dependent variable was drawn from a mixture of Poisson 
random variables. Given the evidence and arguments in Gropp and Moerman (2004) 
and Bae et al. (2003) we do not think that the estimation of this model would be 
advisable. This leaves ordered logit and multinomial logit models as the preferred 
method. The main difference between a multinomial logit model and an ordered logit 
model is that the ordered logit restricts the marginal effects at each outcome to be the 
same. This means that the effect of coexceedances in another country on going from 1 
to 2 bank coexceedances in the dependent variable is restricted to be the same as going 
from 3 to 4 banks, while the multinomial logit model permits for full flexibility in this 
regard. The trade-off is that in a multinomial logit model, there are many more 
parameters to estimate and one may loose degrees of freedom. 
Given these considerations, we decided to use a multinomial logit model as our 
primary specification and use the results from an ordered logit model as a robustness 
check (see section V). Hence, we estimate the number of coexceedances in one country 
(the number of banks simultaneously in the tail) as a function of the number of 
coexceedances in the other countries, controlling for common shocks: 
(2) 
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where j = 1,2,3…J represents the number  of banks in the tail simultaneously 
(“coexceedances”) in country c, Fc the common shocks in country c, Cct-1 the lagged 
number of coexceedances in country c, and Cdt represents the coexceedances in period t 
in country d. As common shocks are controlled for, the significant coefficients of Cdt 
would signal cross-border contagion. 
In order to remove the indeterminacy associated with the model, we follow the 
convention and define Y=0 (zero coexceedances) as the base category. All coefficients, 
hence, are estimated relative to this base. Still, the coefficients from this model are 
difficult to interpret and, therefore, it is useful to also report the marginal effect of the 
regressors. The marginal effects are obtained from the probability for each outcome j 
(3) 
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Differentiating with respect to Cdt yields 
(4) 
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which can be computed from the parameter estimates, with the independent variables 
evaluated at suitable values, along with its standard errors.
17 In all tables we will report 
the estimated coefficients alongside the marginal probabilities obtained from (5). 
 
4.  Estimation results 
4.1. Base model 
The results for the basic contagion estimation are given in Table 5. For each country we 
first report the results for a specification in which the controls for systemic risk and 
common factors are the only explanatory variables. Subsequently, we add the 
coexceedances from other countries. Recall that the dependent variable is the number of 
banks whose first-differenced distance to default was in the negative 95
th tail in a given 
week in a given country. In all countries with more than 3 banks (DE, ES, IT, UK), we 
limited the model to estimating four outcomes, 0, 1, 2 and 3 or more coexceedances, 
while in FR and NL we estimated three outcomes, 0,1 and 2 or more coexceedances.  
                                                      
17 The computation of the standard errors is exceedingly time consuming and most studies do not report them. 
However, both the significance and even the sign could differ between the coefficients and their marginal effects 
(Greene, 2000).   11
First consider the base model without contagion variables for the five 
countries (Table 5, first columns for each country). Recall that in a multinomial logit 
model we estimate coefficients for each outcome. Following the convention, we take the 
outcome of coexceedances equal to zero as the base case. Overall we are able to explain 
between 9 percent (IT) and 17 percent (NL) of the variation in the dependent variable 
using variables measuring common shocks only.
18  
The notion that the number of coexceedances are autocorrelated is supported: 
The lagged (by one day) number of coexceedances tends to be positive and significant 
for all countries. Further, global systemic risk (as measured by the number of stock 
markets in the tail) tends to be positive and significant. A steepening of the yield curve 
tends to be only weakly associated with a higher number of coexceedances in most 
countries; the effect is somewhat stronger in DE and FR. As in Bae et al. (2003), 
increases in conditional volatility are very important in our specification and are always 
significantly (at the 1 percent level) positively related to a higher number of 
coexceedances. All these results conform to expectations. We also checked whether 
conditional volatility in the US stock market matters for coexceedances among 
European banks, but the coefficients tend to be insignificant, except in case of German 
and Italian banks and not for UK banks, where we would have expected US volatility to 
be particularly important.
19   
In order to aide the interpretability of the results, we also report marginal 
probabilities for each coefficients (reported in the second column). We see, for example, 
that a one percent increase in the conditional volatility of the stock market in Germany 
increases the probability of one exceedance by 0.02 percent, the probability of two 
coexceedances by 0.01 percent and of three  or more coexceedances by 0.001 percent. 
All of these marginal probabilities are significant at the one percent level. Similar 
magnitudes are found for all six countries.  
Now consider the evidence on contagion. We measure contagion by including 
the one-day lagged coexceedances in the other five countries. If, controlling for 
common shocks, as we have done, any of these variables turn out to be positive and 
significant, we interpret this as contagion from that country. We also report significance 
tests for the sum of the contagion variables from each country, as well as the sum of all 
contagion variables. We find that the contagion variables are jointly significant at least 
                                                      
18   As a comparison: in the context of emerging markets, Bae et al. (2003) find pseudo R
2 of around 0.1 in a similar 
type of model, using three explanatory variables (conditional volatility, exchange rates and interest rates). 
19 Given that there is ample evidence for stock market spill overs from the US to Europe (see Hartmann et al. (2003), 
these may be captured by our “systemic risk” variable.   12
at the five percent level for explaining the number of coexceedances in all six 
countries. This is also reflected in an increase in Pseudo R
2 of generally about 1 to 2 
percentage points. It is important to note that adding the one-day lagged coexceedances 
from other countries does not result in large changes in the level or significance of the 
controls, suggesting that adding foreign coexceedances adds information to the 
specification.  
The patterns of contagion among countries can be more easily examined using 
Chart 2. In this chart, we represented the joint significance of the lagged coexceedance 
variable in country A in the specification for country B as an arrow from country A to 
country B. A few observations can be made. One, we only find one country pair where 
we have evidence in favour of bi-lateral contagion, namely UK and DE. This means that 
adverse shocks affecting German banks have an impact upon UK banks and vice versa. 
Second, aside from being exposed to contagion from the UK, German banks are also 
exposed to contagion from Spanish and Dutch banks. Second, Spanish banks tend to be 
particularly important for the banking systems in other countries, which  may be 
somewhat surprising. In addition to German banks, also French, UK and Dutch banks 
have been exposed to contagion from the Spanish banking system. Third, Spanish banks 
themselves are exposed to contagion from Italian banks only. 
While we find the contagion variables to be econometrically highly significant, 
their economic magnitude is difficult to interpret. Hence, in order to shed some light on 
this, we have plotted the probability of one or more banks being in the tail (experiencing 
a large shock) conditional on the number of banks in other countries being in the tail on 
the previous day, setting all other control variables to their unconditional mean. Bae et 
al. (2003) in a similar exercise have labelled these types of curves “coexceedance 
response curves” and report that these curves have their origin in epidemiology, where 
they were used to show the spread of infectious disease across regions.  
First let us examine the effect of conditional volatility of the stock market 
(“volatility own”) on coexceedances of banks. In Chart 1 we plotted coexceedances in 
each country as a function of conditional volatility increasing from the lowest 5
th 
percentile (i.e. conditional volatility strongly decreasing) to the highest 5
th percentile. 
Hence, the charts show the effect of the most important common shock on 
coexceedances. We find that the curves are highly non-linear, supporting our use of a 
multinomial logit model. In general, if conditional volatility increases strongly (i.e. 
above the 75
th percentile), the probability of more than one coexceedance increases to 
between 20% (FR) and 50% (IT) from 3% and 20%, respectively. Three or more   13
coexceedances increase from essentially  zero at negative changes in volatility to 
2% (ES) to 10% (IT). These results give use a benchmark against which we can 
evaluate the effects of contagion. 
Now in comparison consider the effect of contagion. First consider the upper left 
hand panel of Chart 3, which shows contagion from French banks to German banks. 
The Chart shows that the probability of 3 or more German banks being in the tail is 1.1 
percent if no French banks are in the tail. If three French banks are in the tail, this 
probability increases to 2.8 percent. In the econometric analysis we found this effect to 
be insignificant. Now consider the case of contagion from The Netherlands to Germany 
(depicted in the fourth panel from the left in Chart 3). The probability that three or more 
German banks are in the tail remains unchanged at just above 1 percent no matter how 
many Dutch banks are in the tail, but the probability that at least one German bank is in 
the tail increases from 20 percent in the case of no Dutch banks in the tail to 42 percent 
in the case of three Dutch banks in the tail. In the econometric analysis we found this 
effect is significant at the 5 percent level. Contagion from Dutch banks to the German 
banking system is significantly stronger than contagion from French banks, but it tends 
to affect only one or two banks, rather than a large number of banks. The opposite is 
true for contagion from Spain to Germany (panel 2 in Chart 3). In this case, the 
probability of one or more coexceedances in Germany is not a function of 
coexceedances in Spain, but the probability three or more coexceedances increases from 
less than one percent to 3.5%. Contagion from Spain tends to affect many banks, rather 
than just one. 
In the case of France (Chart 4), we only found statistically significant contagion 
from Spain, where the probability of two or more coexceedances increases from 0.2% to 
5%. Contagion to Italian banks is also important (Chart 6). For example, in the case of 
no German coexceedances the probability of three or more coexceedances in Italy is 
2.4%; for three or more German coexceedances this probability increases to 5.4%. This 
change is significant at the one percent level. It is also interesting to note that the 
probability that only one bank in Italy is in the tail is not affected by German 
coexceedances. Finally consider the case of contagion to the UK. The case of the UK is 
particularly interesting, because it is the only country in the sample that did not 
introduce the euro in 1999. We find that there is significant contagion to the UK from 
German and Spanish banks. If there are no coexceedances in Germany the probability of 
three or more coexceedances in the UK is 1.1%, which increases to 6.7% if there are 
three or more German coexceedances (the change is significant at the one percent   14
significance level). The contagion  effects  from Spain to the UK, although also 
statistically significant is much smaller: the increase is from 1.2% to 3.5%.
20 Given the 
size and importance of its banking system it may be at first glance surprising that we do 
not find evidence of stronger contagion from the UK to euro area countries. UK 
coexceedances are only significantly related to German coexceedances. The relationship 
between UK banks and the unified euro area money market after 1999 will be explored 
in more detail in the next section. 
 
4.2. Extension: Effect of the introduction of the euro  
The effect of the introduction of the common currency on cross-border contagion risk 
among EU countries is ambiguous ex ante. One could argue that the common currency 
on 1 January 1999 would give rise to further cross-border contagion risk, since it has led 
to a single money market for liquid reserves in euro, strengthening the cross-border 
interbank links among banks. This would be the case, especially, if cross-border 
transactions are mainly conducted by money centre banks. On the other hand, Allen and 
Gale (2000) have argued that in a system, in which interbank liabilities and assets are 
very well diversified across many banks, cross-border contagion risk should decrease. 
Hence, the integration of the money market in the wake of the introduction of the 
common currency may have resulted in a reduction in contagion risk. It is also 
interesting to see the effect of the introduction of the euro on contagion risk to and from 
the UK, as the UK has not joined the euro. 
In order to analyse this issue we estimate the model separately for the pre- and a 
post-euro periods. For the pre-euro period we have 1302 daily observations in the 
sample and for the post euro period we have 1058 observations, i.e. the sample is split 
about in half. The results are reported in Table 6. Before we discuss the results 
regarding contagion, there may be a few issues worth noting about the results more 
generally. One, the fit of the model is better in almost all countries for the post-euro 
period. The pseudo R
2 is higher by 2 percentage points (UK, IT) to 7 percentage points 
(FR). Only in Germany and Spain does it remain the same.  
This result is consistent with the idea that idiosyncratic factors explain less of the 
coexceedances after the euro was introduced and may be suggestive of financial 
integration (see for example Baele et al., 2004). Second, the coefficients on some of the 
                                                      
20   It is quite in line with our priors that we find that German and Spanish banks have contagious effects on the UK. 
German banks have large interbank exposures to the UK and Spanish banks have quite close ties with UK banks, 
as e.g. evidenced by the recent merger between Banco Santander and Abbey National.   15
control variables change substantially,  both in terms of economic magnitude and 
in terms of econometric significance, although conditional volatility remains the most 
important variable explaining coexceedances. 
Charts 9 and 10 represent graphically the estimated patterns of cross-border 
contagion for the two periods. Overall, the introduction of the euro appears to have 
increased cross-border contagion. In order to systematise the discussion, let us 
distinguish three cases: (i) contagion between two countries exists before and after the 
introduction of the euro; (ii) contagion exists only before the introduction of the euro 
and (iii) contagion exists only after the introduction of the euro. In the first category, we 
find that contagion from ES to UK and FR and the bilateral contagion between UK and 
DE have prevailed. As to the second category, we find that there is no longer contagion 
from NL to DE, from FR to IT and from ES to DE. In the third case of new contagion 
patterns, we find that after the euro there is evidence of contagion from FR to UK, UK 
to ES and bilateral contagion between DE and IT. 
In our view, this evidence is consistent not only with somewhat overall higher cross-
border contagion risk, but also with the idea that this higher cross-border contagion risk 
may be related to the integration of the money market in the euro area.  
We now turn to the question whether the economic magnitude of contagion has 
also changed. To examine this, we prepared the conditional probability charts for the 
two periods separately (see Charts 11-16). We conclude from the charts that, overall, the 
economic magnitude of contagion before and after the introduction of the euro has 
remained largely unchanged. Hence, we would conclude that the main change relates to 
the greater presence of contagion after the euro, rather than, given its presence, that its 
effect is stronger. One exception to this may be contagion to and from the UK, which 
we find to possibly have somewhat increased in magnitude, in particular to and from IT, 
NL and ES. Again, we would interpret this as evidence that UK banks may have 
increased their exposure to the common euro area money market. 
 
 
5.  Robustness  
As we are estimating a large number of coefficients, we were concerned that some of 
our results may be spurious. Hence, we subjected the results to five robustness checks: 
(i) we excluded from the sample well-identified systemic crisis periods; (ii) we re-
estimated the model using ordered logit, rather than multinomial logit models; (iii) we   16
added  foreign  country  conditional  volatilities to the specification; (iv) we re-
estimated the model for the largest and smallest banks in the sample separately and (v) 
we relax the assumption of a common stochastic process driving the returns across 
banks.
21 Rather than report a full set of results for each specification, we summarised 
the robustness checks in simple matrix tables reported in Appendix III. 
As a first robustness check, we re-estimated the base model with contagion 
effects (Table 5) excluding the following periods: the week of September 11 (US terror 
attacks), the July and October of 1997 (Asia and Hong Kong crisis) and the first two 
weeks of October 1998 (Russia’s default). The results are reported in the second panel 
in Appendix III. During these time periods, the number of coexceedances was 
particularly high and we were concerned that our results could in part be driven by the 
inability of the control variables to properly account for either event, given that they are 
clearly identified as common shocks, rather than contagion. Comparing the results to 
the first panel of Appendix III, which summarises the base specification in Table 5, 
however, reveals that the results are unaffected by the exclusion of these episodes of 
systemic financial stress. Indeed, the only difference is that we find additional contagion 
risk, namely from ES to IT and from UK to ES. 
As we discussed in section II, there are a number of alternatives for the 
estimation of count data. While we would consider Poisson models and tobit models 
inappropriate for reasons specified above, an ordered logit model seems to represent a 
useful robustness check. As discussed above the main difference is that the ordered logit 
model relies on the assumption of constant marginal effects across the different 
outcomes, while the multinomial logit model permits full flexibility in this regard. The 
advantage of the ordered logit model is that we gain degrees of freedom, as we have to 
estimate each covariate only once and not once for each outcome in the dependent 
variable. When performing this estimation, the results of which are reported in the third 
panel of Appendix III, we found almost identical patterns of contagion compared to the 
base line. The only difference is that we are no longer able to detect any contagion from 
ES to DE. 
Next, it is possible that our results are at least in part driven by volatility spill-
overs from other countries rather than contagion. In order to examine this, we re-
estimated the base model and included also the conditional volatility variables of the 
                                                      
21 We also estimated the model with domestic stock market tail events as a separate explanatory variable (rather than 
subsumed in “systemic risk”). The contagion patterns obtained are broadly unchanged and the domestic stock 
market variable is generally insignificant, suggesting that domestic systemic risk is picked up by the conditional 
volatility variable. The results are available from the authors upon request.   17
other countries in cases where we found  significant contagion. For example, we 
detect contagion from the UK to Germany. It is possible that the coexceedances in the 
UK only proxy for large changes in conditional volatility in the UK, which in turn have 
an effect on coexceedances in Germany. The results of this exercise are reported in 
panel 4 of Appendix III and are identical to our baseline results. 
As documented earlier, our sample of banks is very heterogeneous in size. This 
permits a check of whether our results are primarily driven by large banks or whether 
the presence of relatively small banks has introduced some error or noise into the 
estimation. In general, large banks can be expected to be more important in cross-border 
contagion simply because they are large, but also because interbank money market links 
tend to be primarily through these banks. There is evidence that in the euro area at least, 
tiered structures have emerged in which smaller banks conduct their international 
business through a few large banks. This has resulted in a tiered interbank market 
structure with respect international operations (see e.g. Degryse and Nguyen, 2004). 
To test whether large banks play a disproportionate role in our results we split 
the sample in small and large banks and re-estimated the basic model. An such sample 
split is somewhat arbitrary. In this paper we use all banks larger than EUR 170 billion 
(the median). The results (reported in panel 5 of Appendix III) suggest that the patterns 
when estimating the model with large banks are again very similar to those reported 
earlier, while we find very little contagion from small banks to small banks across 
borders (Appendix III, panel 6). These results are consistent with a tiered interbank 
structure, in which only large banks operate across borders in the interbank market and 
act as money centres for smaller domestic banks.  
Finally, we also re-defined our threshold for exceedances. In the base 
specifications, we used the five percent tail of the joint distribution of all banks in the 
sample. This means that each individual banks may be more or less frequently in the 
tail, depending upon the frequency with which it was hit by a large adverse shock. More 
fundamentally, the approach implicitly relies on the idea that the stochastic process 
governing the distance to default of individual banks is the same. This, given the 
definition of the distance to default (see Appendix I) seems reasonable; however, to 
check the robustness of the results with respect to this assumption we re-estimated the 
models taking bank-specific cut off points at the five percent negative tail. The results 
are essentially identical to the base line, which supports the assumption that the 
stochastic process governing the distance to default of individual banks is similar and 
more generally enhances the confidence in the robustness of the results.    18
6.  Conclusions  
In this paper, we analyse cross-border contagion in the EU banking sector using a 
multinomial logit approach, focussing on the tail observations in a measure derived 
from financial market data. Applying this approach to bank contagion, we modelled 
banks’ default risk using the stock market-based distance to default and examined the 
occurrence of large changes in this measure as depicting major shocks in banks’ 
financial condition. We argued that contagion can be identified, when the incidence of 
such tail events is significantly influenced by a lagged measure of coexceedances of 
banks from another country. In order to distinguish between common shocks affecting 
more than one bank and contagion, we control for tail events in domestic stock markets, 
changes in the yield curve and changes in conditional volatility in the home and the US 
stock market.  
We feel we are able to present fairly strong evidence in favour cross-border 
contagion. Cross-border contagion was found to be significant and economically 
relevant. Moreover the patterns of contagion were robust across a wide variety of 
specifications. This suggests an important pan-European dimension in the monitoring of 
systemic risk; a conclusion which is even strengthened by the fact that we also find the 
relevance of cross-border contagion after the introduction of the euro to have increased. 
While in this paper we do not take a position on the channel of contagion (i.e. payment 
systems, money markets, ownership links, pure contagion), the results suggest that the 
integrated money market may have resulted in an increase in contagion risk. We would 
take this as evidence, that the interbank market is not fully integrated in the sense of 
Allen and Gale’s (2000) complete set of linkages among banks. Instead, the results 
indicate, combined with our finding that there is virtually no contagion among small 
banks, a “tiered” interbank structure at the cross-border level such that small banks only 
deal with domestic counterparties, leaving foreign operations to major international 
banks. 
Overall we would argue that our results should be viewed as a lower bound to 
the true existing contagion risk in the euro area. One, we estimate the model for a 
relatively calm period without major financial disruptions in any of the banking systems 
or in any of the major banks. If contagion risk increases during crises, this is not 
reflected in our estimates. Second, we use lagged coexceedances (by one day) as our 
measure of contagion. If financial markets are semi-efficient and incorporate 
information very quickly, we will miss those cases of contagion taking place within one 
day. Third, in some countries in the sample (e.g. Spain) banks play a dominant role in   19
the available stock market indices,  suggesting that our common shock 
variables, such as conditional volatility, may in fact pick up effects that are related to 
contagion.  
Finally, there may be a puzzle related to the fact that bank by bank interbank 
exposures are not available to the market as a whole (as they are not available to the 
authors). The way we interpret our results implicitly relies on the assumption that 
markets have this data or if they do not, at least use estimates. Alternatively, our results 
could be driven by market participants that do have the data, which are the banks 
themselves. From our perspective this would be a very interesting avenue for further 
research.  
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Table 1. Sample banks (sorted by total assets in 2000, millions of euro) 
1  Deutsche Bank AG  DE  927,900 
2  Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank  DE  694,300  
3 BNP  Paribas  FR  693,053 
4  ABN AMRO Bank N.V.  NL  543,200 
5 Barclays  UK  486,936 
6 Societe  Generale  FR  455,881 
7 Commerzbank  DE  454,500 
8  ING Bank NV  NL  406,393 
9  Banco Santander Central Hispano  ES  347,288 
10 Banca  Intesa  IT 331,364 
11  Abbey National plc  UK  293,395 
12  Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria  ES  292,557 
13 HSBC  UK  288,339 
14  Royal Bank of Scotland  UK  206,176 
15 Bankgesellschaft  Berlin  DE  203,534 
16 UniCredito  Italiano  IT 202,649 
17 Sanpaolo  IMI  IT 171,046 
18 Standard  Chartered  UK  161,934 
19 DePfa  Group  DE  156,446 
20  Banca di Roma  IT  132,729 
21  Natexis Banques Populaires  FR  113,131 
22 BHF-BANK  DE  53,863 
23  Banco Espanol de Credito  ES  44,381 
24  Banca Pop Bergamo  IT  37,670 
25 IKB  Deutsche  Industriebank  DE  32,359 
26  Banco Popular Espanol  ES  31,288 
27  Banca Popolare di Milano  IT  28,282 
28 Banca  Lombarda  IT 26,816 
29  Banca Popolare di Novara  IT  20,959 
30 Credito  Emiliano  IT 15,148 
31 Banca  Agricola  Mantovana  IT 10,190 
32 Banco  Pastor  ES 9,404 
33 Credito  Valtellinese  IT 7,416 
34 Banco  Guipuzcoano  ES 5,518 
35 Kas-Associatie  N.V.  NL  5,417 
36 Banco  Zaragozano  ES 5,175 
37 Schroders  UK  4,180 
38  Banca Popolare di Intra  IT  3,929 
39 Close  Brothers  UK  3,241 
40  Singer & Friedlander Group  UK  2,792 
 Table 2. Variable definitions and summary statistics 
Variable Definition  n  Mean  Median  Std  Dev  Min  Max 
Bank specific variables          
ddit  Distance to default of bank i in week t (see Appendix I)  94,520  4.13  3.73  1.73  0.55  16.59 
Δddit/ Ιddit-1Ι  Percentage change in the distance to default  94,520  0.00  0  0.01  -0.77  0.69** 
  (of which missing values replaced) 1/  343 /  /  /  /  / 
tail  takes value 1 if bank i is in the 95
th percentile negative tail of the distribution of Δddit/ddit-1  94,520 0.05  0  0.22  0  1 
Country specific variables          
Coexceedances DE  Number of banks in the 95
th percentile negative tail of Δddit/ddit-1 in DE  2363 0.34  0  0.75  0  7 
Coexceedances ES  Number of banks in the 95
th percentile negative tail of Δddit/ddit-1 in ES  2363 0.34  0  0.71  0  6 
Coexceedances FR  Number of banks in the 95
th percentile negative tail of Δddit/ddit-1 in FR  2363 0.16  0  0.48  0  3 
Coexceedances IT  Number of banks in the 95
th percentile negative tail of Δddit/ddit-1 in IT  2363 0.56  0  1.12  0  11 
Coexceedances NL  Number of banks in the 95
th percentile negative tail of Δddit/ddit-1 in NL  2363 0.16  0  0.47  0  3 
Coexceedances UK  Number of banks in the 95
th percentile negative tail of Δddit/ddit-1 in UK  2363 0.48  0  0.90  0  7 
Systemic risk DE  Number of markets in the 95th percentile negative tail among US, Emerging, Europe and DE  2363  0.2014  0  0.6104  0  4 
Systemic risk ES  Number of markets in the 95th percentile negative tail among US, Emerging, Europe and ES  2363  0.2014  0  0.6034  0  4 
Systemic risk FR  Number of markets in the 95th percentile negative tail among US, Emerging, Europe and FR  2363  0.2014  0  0.6146  0  4 
Systemic risk IT  Number of markets in the 95th percentile negative tail among US, Emerging, Europe and IT  2363  0.2014  0  0.5935  0  4 
Systemic risk NL  Number of markets in the 95th percentile negative tail among US, Emerging, Europe and NL  2363  0.2014  0  0.6062  0  4 
Systemic risk UK  Number of markets in the 95th percentile negative tail among US, Emerging, Europe and UK  2363  0.2014  0  0.6048  0  4 
Yield curve DE  Change in the slope of the yield curve in DE  2363  0.0004  0.0000  0.0385  -0.1900  0.3800 
Yield curve ES  Change in the slope of the yield curve in ES  2363  0.0006  -0.0020  0.0682  -0.5400  0.4840 
Yield curve FR  Change in the slope of the yield curve in FR  2363  0.0006  -0.0046  0.0645  -0.8000  0.3198 
Yield curve IT*  Change in the slope of the yield curve in IT  2363  0.0002  -0.0010  0.1511  -2.5580  2.5960 
Yield curve NL  Change in the slope of the yield curve in NL  2363  0.0003  0.0000  0.0512  -0.3000  0.3210 
Yield curve UK  Change in the slope of the yield curve in UK  2363  0.0013  0.0000  0.0814  -0.8740  0.5460 
Volatility DE*  Change in the volatility of the stock market in DE  2362  0.0072  -0.3141 3.0809  -10.5551 47.7505 
Volatility ES*  Change in the volatility of the stock market in ES  2362  0.0011  -0.3486 2.4996  -9.2267  32.1450 
Volatility FR*  Change in the volatility of the stock market in FR  2362  0.0044  -0.2951 1.9286  -4.8973  47.0638 
Volatility IT*  Change in the volatility of the stock market in IT  2362  0.0045  -0.6004 4.1482  -15.1464 63.3724 
Volatility NL*  Change in the volatility of the stock market in NL  2362  0.0060  -0.2482 2.8988  -10.9020 32.1924 
Volatility UK*  Change in the volatility of the stock market in UK  2362  0.0045  -0.1762 1.5277  -6.5127  21.0707 
Volatility US*  Change in the volatility of the stock market in US  2362  0.0054  -0.2353 2.1676  -5.2696  34.7094 
Memo items              
Cut off point of the 95th percentile of Δddit/Ιddit-1Ι  -0.0085        
1/ Number of observations imputed by linear interpolation: Close Brothers (20 observations), ING(1 observation), Natexis (1 observation). Number of observations added with random number 
generator: BHF (113 observations), BNP (208 observations). 
* This variable has been multiplied by 1000. 
 
| | / it it dd dd ΔTable 3. Description of the sample by countries  
 
 
Number of 
observations 
Number of 
banks 
Percentage of total 
assets of 
commercial banks 
Number of 
observations per bank 
Maximum 
number of 
coexceedan
ces 
France 7,089  3  36.0  2363  3 
Germany 16,541  7  46.5  2363  7 
28,356 12  52.1  2363  11 
The Netherlands  7,089  3  58.9  2363  3 
Spain 16,541 7  68.3  2363  6 
UK 18,904  8  56.1  2363  7 
Total 94,520  40  /  /  20 
Table 4. Coexceedances by countries  
  France* 
(FR) 
Germany 
(DE) 
Italy 
(IT) 
The 
Netherlands* 
(NL) 
Spain 
(ES) 
United 
Kingdom 
(UK) 
Coexceedances  =  0  2085 1822 1591 2066 1795 1628 
Coexceedances  =  1  203 385 495 219 407 486 
Coexceedances  =  2  75  89 152 78 111  161 
Coexceedances ≥ 3  -  67  125  -  50  88 
Total  2363 2363 2363 2363 2363 2363 
 
*Due to the small number of banks in the sample, for France and The Netherlands the analysis is limited to coexceedances ≥ 2. 
.    
Table 5. Multinomial logit model: Contagion in daily coexceedances of the first differenced distance to default,  large EU countries, January 1993-January 2003 
Dependent variable: number of domestic banks simultaneously in the tai (“coexceedances”). Base case: Zero coexceedances. *, ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All models estimated with 2362 
daily observations. Robust standard errors are used.  
 
  France  Germany  Italy 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb 
Coexceedances=1                         
   Constant  -2.47***    -2.57***    -1.78***    -1.92***    -1.35***    -1.41***   
   Coexceedances lagged  0.40**  0.030**  0.28*  0.021*  0.61***  0.078***  0.51***  0.065***  0.36***  0.045***  0.31***  0.039*** 
   Systemic risk  0.24**  0.018**  0.21*  0.016*  0.15  0.020  0.11  0.014  0.24***  0.034**  0.22**  0.031** 
   Yield curve  0.40  0.032  0.36  0.028  1.97  0.241  1.96  0.241  -0.01  -0.010  -0.19  -0.012 
   Volatility own  0.29***  0.022***  0.29***  0.022***  0.15***  0.018***  0.16***  0.020***  0.10***  0.013***  0.10***  0.013*** 
   Volatility US  -0.01  -0.001  -0.02  -0.002  0.02  0.002  0.01  0.000  0.02  0.002  0.01  0.001 
   Contagion DE      0.03  0.002              -0.01  -0.007 
   Contagion FR              0.07  0.009      0.05  0.010 
   Contagion IT      -0.09  -0.007      0.11  0.016*         
   Contagion NL      -0.08  -0.006      0.40***  0.053***      0.12  0.017 
   Contagion ES      0.29***  0.022***      -0.10  -0.017      0.01  0.001 
   Contagion UK      0.15  0.011      0.16**  0.020*      0.14**  0.023* 
Coexceedances=2                         
   Constant  -4.35***    -4.62***    -3.59***    -3.87***    -2.81***    -2.94***  
   Coexceedances lagged  0.90***  0.012***  0.68***  0.009**  0.95***  0.024***  0.77***  0.018***  0.70***  0.034***  0.62*** 0.030*** 
   Systemic risk  0.39**  0.005**  0.35**  0.004**  0.09  0.002  0.01  -0.000  0.36***  0.017***  0.31*** 0.015** 
   Yield curve  -0.27  -0.004  -0.31  -0.0044  6.39***  0.178***  6.44***  0.168***  0.55  0.032  0.57 0.032 
   Volatility own  0.64***  0.009***  0.65***  0.008***  0.30***  0.008***  0.31***  0.008***  0.15***  0.007***  0.15*** 0.007*** 
   Volatility US  0.08*  0.001*  0.07  0.001  0.05  0.001  0.02  0.001  -0.00  -0.000  -0.01 -0.001 
   Contagion DE      0.28  0.004              0.23* 0.012* 
   Contagion FR              0.09  0.002      -0.08 -0.005 
   Contagion IT      -0.07  -0.001      -0.14  -0.004        
   Contagion NL      -0.25  -0.003      0.48**  0.011**      0.11 0.005 
   Contagion ES      0.54***  0.007**      0.29*  0.008*      0.09 0.005 
   Contagion UK      0.09  0.001      0.37***  0.009***      0.12 0.005 
  
Table 5 (continued). Multinomial logit model: Contagion in daily coexceedances of the first differenced distance to default,  large EU countries, January 1993-January 2003 
 
  France  Germany  Italy 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb 
Coexceedances=3                         
   Constant          -4.61***    -5.01***    -3.91***    -3.99***   
   Coexceedances lagged          1.28***  0.015***  1.07***  0.011***  1.15***  0.026***  1.11***  0.025*** 
   Systemic risk          0.39***  0.005**  0.22  0.002  0.39***  0.008**  0.37***  0.007** 
   Yield curve          0.12  -0.005  0.54  0.000  0.09  0.001  0.15  0.003 
   Volatility own          0.39***  0.005***  0.41***  0.004***  0.29***  0.007***  0.30***  0.007*** 
   Volatility US          0.12**  0.002**  0.09*  0.001*  0.09***  0.002**  0.08**  0.002** 
   Contagion DE                      0.30**  0.007** 
   Contagion FR              0.32  0.004      0.09  0.002 
   Contagion IT              0.26  0.003         
   Contagion NL              0.10  0.000      0.20  0.004 
   Contagion ES              0.42**  0.005**      -0.00  -0.000 
   Contagion UK              0.20  0.002      -0.12  -0.004 
Pseudo R2  0.14  0.15  0.10  0.12  0.09  0.10 
Log-likelihood  -878  -867  -1523  -1493  -1982  -1972 
N  2361  2361  2361  2361  2361  2361 
ΣContagion DE    1.36        4.21** 
ΣContagion FR        1.07    0.03 
ΣContagion IT    0.66    0.81     
ΣContagion NL    0.56    5.30**    1.34 
ΣContagion ES    11.08***    4.08**    0.14 
ΣContagion UK    0.92    9.01***    0.33 
ΣContagion     4.69**    25.91***    6.47** 
  
Table 5 (continued). Multinomial logit model: Contagion in daily coexceedances of the first differenced distance to default,  large EU countries, January 1993-January 2003 
 
  The Netherlands  Spain  United Kingdom 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb 
Coexceedances=1                         
   Constant  -2.54***    -2.72***    -1.72***    -1.82***    -1.48***    -1.60***   
   Coexceedances lagged  0.77***  0.060***  0.55***  0.043***  0.59***  0.079***  0.54***  0.073***  0.42***  0.057***  0.33***  0.044*** 
   Systemic risk  0.49***  0.039***  0.43***  0.034***  0.23**  0.029**  0.21**  0.027**  0.61***  0.092***  0.58***  0.089*** 
   Yield curve  0.78  0.064  0.65  0.053  0.11  0.007  0.03  -0.002  -0.35  -0.052  -0.42  -0.062 
   Volatility own  0.25***  0.019***  0.26***  0.020***  0.27***  0.035***  0.27***  0.036***  0.29***  0.041***  0.33***  0.046*** 
   Volatility US  0.02  0.001  0.00  0.0002  0.04  0.005  0.03  0.005  0.02  0.003  0.00  0.001 
   Contagion DE      0.14  0.011      0.07  0.010      0.12  0.017 
   Contagion FR      0.28*  0.022*      0.02  0.000      0.02  0.007 
   Contagion IT      0.24***  0.019***      0.21***  0.030***      0.07  0.012 
   Contagion NL              -0.07  -0.011      0.14  0.022 
   Contagion ES      -0.01  -0.001              0.24***  0.035** 
   Contagion UK      0.00  0.000      0.01  -0.001         
Coexceedances=2                         
   Constant  -4.39***    -4.76***    -3.51***    -3.71***    -3.00***    -3.16***   
   Coexceedances lagged  1.16***  0.016***  0.65***  0.008**  0.91***  0.030***  0.73***  0.021***  0.87***  0.043***  0.76***  0.037*** 
   Systemic risk  0.38*  0.005  0.25  0.003  0.55***  0.020***  0.48***  0.015***  0.70***  0.030***  0.68***  0.029*** 
   Yield curve  -0.76  -0.012  -1.44  -0.020  0.76  0.024  0.46  0.015  -0.71  -0.036  -0.89  -0.044 
   Volatility own  0.47***  0.006***  0.48***  0.006***  0.46***  0.014***  0.47***  0.014***  0.54***  0.0326**  0.56***  0.026*** 
   Volatility US  0.08**  0.001**  0.05  0.001  -0.03  -0.001  -0.06  -0.002  -0.01  -0.001  -0.03  -0.002 
   Contagion DE      0.08  0.001      0.08  0.002      0.15  0.006 
   Contagion FR      0.23  0.003      0.30  0.010      -0.22  -0.012 
   Contagion IT      0.30**  0.004**      0.10  0.002      0.00  -0.001 
   Contagion NL              0.04  0.002      0.25  0.012 
   Contagion ES      0.47***  0.006***              0.43***  0.020*** 
   Contagion UK      0.07  0.001      0.28**  0.010**          
 
Table 5 (continued). Multinomial logit model: Contagion in daily coexceedances of the first differenced distance to default,  large EU countries, January 1993-January 2003 
 
  The Netherlands  Spain  United Kingdom 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb 
Coexceedances=3                         
   Constant          -5.04***    -5.37***    -4.50***    -4.92***   
   Coexceedances lagged          1.11***  0.008***  0.82***  0.006***  1.01***  0.015***  0.94***  0.011*** 
   Systemic risk          0.78***  0.006***  0.68***  0.005***  1.01***  0.013***  0.95***  0.011*** 
   Yield curve          2.55  0.021  2.12  0.017  0.43  0.009  0.24  0.005 
   Volatility own          0.56***  0.004***  0.57***  0.004***  0.82***  0.011***  0.88***  0.010*** 
   Volatility US          0.07*  0.001  0.04  0.000  0.07  0.001  0.05  0.001 
   Contagion DE              0.30*  0.002*      0.65***  0.008*** 
   Contagion FR              0.27  0.002      -0.52*  -0.007* 
   Contagion IT              0.32*  0.002      0.24  0.003 
   Contagion NL              0.03  0.000      -0.26  -0.004 
   Contagion ES                      0.47***  0.005** 
   Contagion UK              0.20  0.001         
Pseudo R2  0.17  0.18  0.12  0.13  0.12  0.13 
Log-likelihood  -881  -866  -1531  -1516  -1848  -1821 
N  2361  2361  2361  2361  2361  2361 
ΣContagion DE    0.97    2.19    13.35*** 
ΣContagion FR    2.84*    1.91    2.21 
ΣContagion IT    10.38***    5.77**    1.82 
ΣContagion NL        0.00    0.10 
ΣContagion ES    4.47**        17.31*** 
ΣContagion UK    0.12    2.65     
ΣContagion     18.44***    13.40***    9.61*** 
  
Table 6. Multinomial logit model: Contagion in daily coexceedances of the first differenced distance to default,  large EU countries, January 1993-January 2003, pre and post euro 
 
  France  Germany  Italy 
  Pre euro  Post  euro  Pre euro  Post  euro  Pre euro  Post  euro 
  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb 
Coexceedances=1                         
Constant  -2.36***    -3.01***    -1.96***    -1.88***    -1.15***    -1.77***   
Coexceedances lagged  0.40*  0.034*  0.28  0.015  0.38***  0.050***  0.74***  0.096***  0.31***  0.040***  0.22*  0.0232 
Systemic risk  0.07  0.005  0.45***  0.024***  0.41**  0.056**  -0.08  -0.012  0.35**  0.053*  0.22*  0.030* 
Yield curve  -0.08  -0.006  3.78  0.205  4.36**  0.575**  -2.07  -0.286  -0.10  -0.024  0.30  0.033 
Volatility own  0.54***  0.046***  0.18**  0.009**  0.26***  0.032***  0.13***  0.017***  0.11***  0.015***  0.10***  0.013*** 
Volatility US  -0.16  -0.014  0.01  0.001  0.01  0.001  -0.00  -0.000  -0.02  -0.005  0.01  0.001 
Contagion DE  -0.00  -0.001  -0.01  -0.001          -0.23**  -0.046**  0.32**  0.045** 
Contagion FR          0.10  0.013  0.08  0.010  0.20  0.028  -0.20  -0.021 
Contagion IT  -0.07  -0.006  -0.25  -0.014  0.14*  0.023*  0.02  0.001         
Contagion NL  0.07  0.007  -0.92**  -0.050**  0.64***  0.086***  0.05  0.008  0.19  0.032  0.03  -0.001 
Contagion ES  0.25*  0.021*  0.41**  0.022**  -0.15  -0.025  -0.04  -0.007  -0.11  -0.018  0.22  0.030 
Contagion UK  0.04  0.003  0.37**  0.020**  0.17  0.021  0.18  0.023  0.09  0.021  0.20*  0.027 
Coexceedances=2                         
Constant  -4.56***    -4.76***    -3.66***    -4.23***    -2.58***    -3.51***   
Coexceedances lagged  0.82**  0.009**  0.46  0.005  0.43**  0.009**  1.24***  0.026***  0.53***  0.028*** 0.71*** 0.027*** 
Systemic risk  0.46**  0.005*  0.31  0.003  0.34  0.007  -0.09  -0.002  0.48**  0.025** 0.26*  0.009 
Yield curve  -1.07  -0.012  2.50  0.028  8.68***  0.209***  -1.52  -0.028  0.2  0.017 1.45 0.058 
Volatility own  0.91***  0.010***  0.59***  0.007***  0.59***  0.014***  0.25***  0.005***  0.15***  0.008*** 0.16*** 0.006*** 
Volatility US  0.02  0.000  0.10*  0.001*  0.05  0.001  -0.04  -0.001  -0.03  -0.002 -0.01 -0.001 
Contagion DE  0.31  0.004  0.22  0.003          0.17  0.016 0.37* 0.012 
Contagion FR          -0.10  -0.003  0.11  0.002  0.33  0.018 -0.96**  -0.038** 
Contagion IT  -0.15  -0.002  0.04  0.001  -0.55***  -0.015***  0.22  0.005       
Contagion NL  -1.02**  -0.012**  0.38  0.005  0.68***  0.015**  0.00  -0.000  0.08  0.001 0.38 0.016 
Contagion ES  0.48*  0.005*  0.72**  0.008**  0.38*  0.010**  0.38  0.009  -0.16  -0.009 0.42**  0.016** 
Contagion UK  0.12  0.001  -0.20  -0.003  0.39**  0.009**  0.28  0.006  -0.06  -0.005 0.33* 0.012* 
  
Table 6 (continued). Multinomial logit model: Contagion in daily coexceedances of the first differenced distance to default,  large EU countries, January 1993-January 2003, pre 
and post euro 
 
  France  Germany  Italy 
  Pre euro  Post  euro  Pre euro  Post  euro  Pre euro  Post  euro 
  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb 
Coexceedances=3                         
Constant          -4.78***    -5.69***    -3.68***    -4.58***   
Coexceedances lagged          0.89***  0.010***  1.40***  0.008***  1.00***  0.028***  1.26***  0.019*** 
Systemic risk          0.24  0.002  0.35*  0.002  0.56***  0.014**  0.32  0.004 
Yield curve          -1.45  -0.031  5.04  0.037  0.04  0.002  0.55  0.007 
Volatility own          0.73***  0.009***  0.34***  0.002***  0.32***  0.009***  0.29***  0.004*** 
Volatility US          -0.09  -0.001  0.15**  0.001**  0.12***  0.004***  0.03  0.000 
Contagion DE                  0.08  0.004  0.62**  0.001** 
Contagion FR          0.50  0.006  0.08  0.000  0.32  0.008  -0.36  -0.005 
Contagion IT          -0.06  -0.001  0.68**  0.005*         
Contagion NL          0.20  0.001  -0.21  -0.002  0.31  0.008  0.16  0.002 
Contagion ES          0.67***  0.009***  -0.12  -0.001  0.03  0.002  -0.12  -0.003 
Contagion UK          0.06  0.000  0.34  0.002  -0.21  -0.007  0.11  0.001 
Pseudo R2  0.14  0.21  0.15  0.14  0.10  0.12 
Log-likelihood  -506  -332  -808  -639  -1168  -766 
N  1302  1058  1302  1058  1302  1058 
ΣContagion DE  0.76  0.17      0.01  9.40*** 
ΣContagion FR      0.47  0.14  3.77*  4.47** 1/ 
ΣContagion IT  0.66  0.44  2.10  3.97**     
ΣContagion NL  2.73* 1/  0.53  6.94***  0.04  1.67  0.62 
ΣContagion ES  4.98**  8.27***  5.80**  0.17  0.60  0.98 
Σcontagion UK  0.23  0.20  3.28*  3.75*  0.27  2.42 
Σcontagion  0.00  1.28  8.33***  5.98**  2.83*  3.29* 
 
1/ The sum of the coefficients is significantly negative. Not represented as an arrow in Charts 9 and 10. 
Table 6 (continued). Multinomial logit model: Contagion in daily coexceedances of the first differenced distance to default,  large EU countries, January 1993-January 2003, pre and post euro 
 
  The Netherlands  Spain  United Kingdom 
  Pre euro  Post  euro  Pre euro  Post  euro  Pre euro  Post  euro 
  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb 
Coexceedances=1                         
Constant  -2.40***    -3.16***    -1.58***    -2.10***    -1.51***    -1.79***   
Coexceedances lagged  0.56***  0.050***  0.52*  0.033*  0.46***  0.064***  0.66***  0.087***  0.39***  0.058***  0.32**  0.039* 
Systemic risk  0.51***  0.050***  0.46***  0.029***  -0.14  -0.025  0.34***  0.044***  0.63***  0.100***  0.64***  0.094*** 
Yield curve  -0.67  -0.060  2.14  0.135  -0.47  -0.080  1.09  0.162  -1.21  -0.212  1.04  0.176 
Volatility own  0.28***  0.024***  0.25***  0.015***  0.42***  0.059***  0.21***  0.026***  0.84***  0.134***  0.20***  0.026*** 
Volatility US  -0.01  -0.001  0.00  0.000  0.02  0.007  0.02  0.002  -0.02  -0.004  -0.00  0.000 
Contagion DE  0.05  0.004  0.24  0.016  0.02  0.002  0.17  0.022  0.16  0.027  0.10  0.009 
Contagion FR  0.33*  0.030*  0.15  0.009  0.05  0.005  -0.17  -0.024  0.22  0.046*  -0.31  -0.044 
Contagion IT  0.15  0.014  0.34**  0.021**  0.20**  0.030**  0.21*  0.028*  0.05  0.010  0.08  0.012 
Contagion NL          -0.23  -0.035  0.11  0.015  0.07  0.011  0.30  0.044 
Contagion ES  -0.14  -0.013  0.19  0.012          0.14  0.017  0.42***  0.062*** 
Contagion UK  -0.11  -0.010  0.10  0.006  -0.20  -0.030*  0.20*  0.026         
Coexceedances=2                         
Constant  -4.69***    -5.04***    -3.51***    -4.26***    -3.00***    -3.37***   
Coexceedances lagged  0.62*  0.007  0.48  0.005  0.67***  0.019***  0.93***  0.020***  0.71***  0.034***  0.89***  0.044*** 
Systemic risk  0.44*  0.005  0.16  0.001  0.32  0.011  0.65***  0.014***  0.84***  0.038***  0.66***  0.027*** 
Yield curve  -0.14  -0.001  0.42  0.003  1.07  0.038  -2.24  -0.06  -0.05  0.016  -1.47  -0.095 
Volatility own  0.66***  0.008***  0.42***  0.004***  0.69***  0.020***  0.40***  0.009***  1.06***  0.047***  0.43***  0.020*** 
Volatility US  0.03  0.000  -0.06  0.001  -0.65***  -0.022***  -0.00  -0.000  -0.07  -0.003  -0.04  -0.002 
Contagion DE  0.21  0.003  -0.24  -0.003  0.08  0.003  0.13  0.002  0.00  -0.002  0.36*  0.018* 
Contagion FR  0.18  0.002  0.38  0.004  0.30  0.009  0.15  0.004  -0.24  -0.016  -0.41  -0.018 
Contagion IT  0.08  0.001  0.63**  0.006**  0.07  0.001  0.02  -0.000  -0.05  -0.004  0.00  -0.001 
Contagion NL          -0.06  -0.001  0.21  0.005  0.21  0.011  0.35  0.015 
Contagion ES  0.56***  0.008***  0.12  0.001          0.44***  0.022**  0.43**  0.019* 
Contagion UK  -0.04  -0.000  0.32  0.003  0.05  0.003  0.49***  0.011**         
  
Table 6 (continued). Multinomial logit model: Contagion in daily coexceedances of the first differenced distance to default,  large EU countries, January 1993-January 2003, pre and post euro 
 
  The Netherlands  Spain  United Kingdom 
  Pre euro  Post  euro  Pre euro  Post  euro  Pre euro  Post  euro 
  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb  Coeff  ΔProb 
Coexceedances=3                         
Constant          -5.12***    -5.78***    -5.38***    -5..02***   
Coexceedances lagged          0.66**  0.004*  1.02***  0.006**  1.18***  0.009***  1.01***  0.012*** 
Systemic risk          0.86***  0.007***  0.50**  0.003*  1.06***  0.007***  1.03***  0.011*** 
Yield curve          1.95  0.016  -1.12  -0.008  -2.87  -0.022  4.10**  0.053* 
Volatility own          0.88***  0.006***  0.43***  0.002***  1.87***  0.014***  0.63***  0.007*** 
Volatility US          0.09  0.001  0.01  0.000  0.05  0.001  0.05  0.001 
Contagion DE          0.17  0.001  0.57**  0.003*  0.48**  0.004**  1.01***  0.013*** 
Contagion FR          0.24  0.002  0.01  0.000  -0.82*  -0.007*  -0.59  -0.007 
Contagion IT          0.21  0.001  0.28  0.002  0.25  0.002  0.08  0.001 
Contagion NL          0.13  0.001  -0.07  -0.001  -0.43  -0.004  -0.10  -0.002 
Contagion ES                  0.68***  0.005**  0.07  -0.001 
Contagion UK          -0.08  -0.000  0.51  0.003         
Pseudo R2  0.18  0.23  0.15  0.15  0.14  0.16 
Log-likelihood  -509  -334  -837  -632  -991  -780 
N  1302  1058  1302  1058  1302  1058 
ΣContagion DE  0.84  0.00  0.49  2.98*  3.24*  11.98*** 
ΣContagion FR  1.84  1.20  1.12  0.00  1.50  3.02* 
ΣContagion IT  1.32  8.41***  1.94  1.52  0.69  0.14 
ΣContagion NL      0.08  0.13  0.06  0.65 
ΣContagion ES  2.41  0.55      13.49***  3.40* 
ΣContagion UK  0.28  1.51  0.30  7.04***     
ΣContagion  4.06**  12.47***  1.27  9.11***  1.54  4.12** 
 
    
Chart 1. Response curves to volatility shocks. 
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Chart 2. Contagion directions (dotted line indicate significance of contagion parameters at 10% level) 
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Chart 3. contagion to Germany 
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Chart 4. contagion to France 
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Chart 5. contagion to Spain 
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Chart 6. Contagion to Italy 
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Chart 7. Contagion to the Netherlands 
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Chart 8. Contagion to the United Kingdom 
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Chart 9. Contagion directions – pre euro  (dotted line indicate significance of contagion parameters at 10% level) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 10. Contagion directions - post euro  (dotted line indicate significance of contagion parameters at 10% level) 
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Chart 11. Response curves pre and post euro for Germany. 
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Chart 12. Response curves pre and post euro for France. 
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Chart 13. Response curves pre and post euro for Italy. 
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Chart 14. Response curves pre and post euro for the Netherlands. 
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Chart 15. Response curves pre and post euro for Spain. 
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Chart 16. Response curves pre and post euro for UK. 
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Appendix I. Calculation of distances to default 
The distance of default is derived by starting with the Black-Scholes model, in which the time path of the 
market value of assets follows a stochastic process:
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which gives the asset value at time T (i.e. maturity of debt), given its current value (V). ε is the random 
component of the firm’s return on assets, which the Black-Scholes model assumes is normally distributed, 
with zero mean and unit variance, N(0,1).  
Hence, the current distance d from the default point (where  D V ln ln = ) can be expressed as: 
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That is, the distance to default, dd  
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represents the number of asset value standard deviations (σ) that the firm is from the default point. The 
inputs to dd, V and σ, can be calculated from observable market value of equity capital (VE ), volatility of 
equity σE , and D  (total debt liabilities) using the system of equations below: 
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 (A4) 
The system of equations was solved by using the generalised reduced gradient method to yield the values 
for V and σ, which in turn entered into the calculation of the distance to default..
 1 The results were found 
robust with respect to the choice of starting values. The measure of bank risk used in this paper is then 
                                                      
1    See KMV Corporation (2002), Vassalou and Xing (2004), Eom et al. (2004), Delianedis and Geske (2003), 
Bharath and Shumway (2004) for a similar derivation and more ample discussions. Duan (1994, 2000) proposes 
an alternative way to calculate the distance to default, which is based on maximum likelihood estimation of the 
parameters. We feel that our choice of the “traditional” approach is justified by the fact that the distance to default 
does not enter directly in our model. Instead, we use it to build a count variable that takes value 1 if the change in 
distance to default falls in the bottom 95th percentile and 0 elsewhere. In our opinion, this transformation smoothes 
differences between different computations methods of distance to default. In order to make this point clear, it must 
be kept in mind that one of the main differences between the traditional method and the Duan’s approach is that in 
the former stock volatility is estimated using historical data. Duan (1994, 2000), hence, corrects that in periods of 
increasing prices, the traditional approach tends to overestimate the default probability, while the opposite happens 
in period of decreasing prices. As we do not consider the level of the distance to default but the change, the 
distortion is essentially spread out through the sample. It is also important to stress that in our study we use data at 
relatively high frequency and therefore any movements in the distance to default will largely be driven by changes 
in equity prices under either approach.  
obtained by first differencing (A3), yielding the change in the number of standard deviations away from the 
default point, which is denoted as Δdd. 
As underlying data we used daily values for the equity market capitalisation, VE from Datastream. The 
equity volatility, σE, was estimated as the standard deviation of the daily absolute equity returns and, as 
proposed in Marcus and Shaked (1984), we took the 6-month moving average (backwards) to reduce noise. 
The presumption is that the market participants do not use the very volatile short-term estimates, but more 
smoothed volatility measures. This is not an efficient procedure as it imposes the volatility to be constant. 
However, equity volatility is accurately estimated for a specific time interval, as long as leverage does not 
change substantially over that period (see for example Bongini et. al., 2001). The total debt liabilities, D, 
are obtained from published accounts and are interpolated (using a cubic spline) to yield daily observations. 
this suggests that our variation in the dependent variable arises from either changes in the value of the bank 
or in changes in volatility. The time to the maturing of the debt, T was set to one year, which is the common 
benchmark assumption without particular information about the maturity structure. Finally, we used the 
government bond rates as the risk-free rates, r. 
 
 
  
Appendix II. Results from a GARCH (1,1) model 
Estimated coefficients of the Garch (1,1) model for the daily stock market 
returns in the analysed countries. Equation and variable definitions given 
in text. 
 
  coef std  err  z-stat prob 
FR      
Const  0.00 0.00 3.03 0.00 
ε
2
t-1  0.06 0.01 9.60 0.00 
σ
2
t-1  0.93  0.01 125.21 0.00 
DE      
Const  0.00 0.00 5.64 0.00 
ε
2
t-1  0.10 0.01  10.47  0.00 
σ
2
t-1  0.89 0.01  97.08  0.00 
IT      
Const  0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 
ε
2
t-1  0.11 0.01 9.84 0.00 
σ
2
t-1  0.86 0.01  58.21  0.00 
NL      
Const  0.00 0.00 3.68 0.00 
ε
2
t-1  0.09 0.01  10.11  0.00 
σ
2
t-1  0.91  0.01 102.81 0.00 
ES      
Const  0.00 0.00 5.67 0.00 
ε
2
t-1  0.08 0.01  10.08  0.00 
σ
2
t-1  0.91  0.01 108.16 0.00 
UK      
Const  0.00 0.00 3.61 0.00 
ε
2
t-1  0.08 0.01 9.17 0.00 
σ
2
t-1  0.91 0.01  99.71  0.00 
US      
Const  0.00 0.00 4.61 0.00 
ε
2
t-1  0.07 0.01  11.80  0.00 
σ
2
t-1  0.92  0.01 144.88 0.00 
  
Appendix III. Robustness checks 
Panel 1: Results of the basic contagion model (see table 5) 
 
to from  DE  FR  IT  NL  ES  UK 
DE  X        **  **  *** 
FR     X        ***    
IT  **     X          
NL     *  ***  X  **    
ES        **     X    
UK  ***           ***  X 
 
Panel 2: Results after excluding major crises from the sample (Asia, July 1997, Russia, 
October 1998 and September 11, 2001) 
 
to from  DE  FR  IT  NL  ES  UK 
DE  X           ***  ** 
FR     X        ***    
IT  *     X     ** *    
NL     *  ***  X  **    
ES        **     X  * 
UK  ***           ***  X 
 
Panel 3: Results using an ordered logit model 
 
to from  DE  FR  IT  NL  ES  UK 
DE  X        ***     *** 
FR     X        ***    
IT  *     X          
NL     **  ***  X      
ES        ***     X    
UK  ***           ***  X 
 
Panel 4: Adding the volatilities of the countries with significant contagion coefficients  
 
to from  DE  FR  IT  NL  ES  UK 
DE  X        **  **  *** 
FR     X        ***    
IT  **     X          
NL     *  ***   X  *     
ES        **     X    
UK  ***           ***  X 
 
Panel 5: Results using large banks only 
  
to from  DE  FR  IT  NL  ES  UK 
DE  X        ***     *** 
FR     X        ***    
IT  **     X          
NL     **     X  ***    
ES        **     X  * 
UK  ***     ***        X 
 
Panel 6: Results using small banks only 
 
to from  DE  FR  IT  NL  ES  UK 
DE  X              
FR     X            
IT       X  **        
NL          X      
ES        **     X   
UK         *   ***   X 
Note: We find a negative impact of From French and Dutch banks on German banks and from French banks on UK 
banks. 
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